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Abstract 
This bachelor thesis in political science focuses on the possibility to achieve 
reforms of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, making the policy 
less trade distorting. Sociological, Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism 
are applied to explain both the persistence and the evolution of the CAP. 
Persistence is mainly attributed to the decision making level of the CAP in 
combination with the perception of agriculture as a unique sector that requires 
state assistance, which makes radical reforms or an abolishment of the policy 
close to inconceivable. A moderate approach thus appears more realistic. This 
thesis identifies external pressure from trade negotiations as the primary driver of 
reform. Modulation, shifting funds to the less trade-distorting Rural Development 
Pillar, is identified as the primary tool for making successful reforms while still 
preserving the legitimacy of the CAP. An assessment of the three institutionalisms 
concludes that they lack the ability to explain the drivers of reform, but are 
however highly instrumental in explaining inertia as well as the evolution of the 
tools necessary for reform to be successful. 
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1 Introduction 
European integration has resulted in a level of economic cooperation not seen 
anywhere else in the world. With the establishment of the Common Market, 
goods, services, capital and labor can travel freely across the borders of the 
European Union. In addition, the EU is a customs union with a common external 
tariff and quota system, and a common commercial policy. Herein lies however 
the flipside of the coin, as customs unions generally divert more external trade 
than do ordinary free trade areas (Dinan, 2008, p.27).  
This element of outside protectionism is expensive: Estimations show that 
discrimination against non-EU producers was costing the EU the equivalent of 
Spain’s annual GDP every year, not accounting for the cost brought upon the rest 
of the world (Messerlin, 2001, p.40). 
This thesis will consider what is probably the most well known of the Union’s 
protectionist policies: The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
1.1 Problem Formulation 
According to Oxfam International, the average EU-cow receives subsidies worth 
2 dollars a day, which is more than what almost half of the world’s population 
earns a day (Oxfam1). This rather tendentious criticism demonstrates the extent to 
which the CAP is “a favorite whipping boy of eurosceptics” (Peterson, 2004, 
p.130). Nevertheless, the policy remains in place, fifty years after its conception.  
This bachelor thesis in political science will examine the persistence of the 
CAP, and furthermore, what can be done about it. The main purpose is to answer 
the following question: 
 
What is the most feasible manner to achieve future reforms of the CAP with 
the purpose to get rid of the trade-distorting elements of the policy? 
 
This question will be answered using three perspectives from the New 
Institutionalist School. This school has a good record of explaining institutional 
persistence. Indeed there is a debate whether New Institutionalism is equipped to 
explain changes in institutions (See for example Lowndes, 2002, p. 105 and Kay, 
2003). This thesis will demonstrate that while there are limits to what this 
theoretical framework can incorporate, there are substantial possibilities as well. 
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1.2 Disposition 
This thesis consists of five phases, bringing the conclusions from one phase to the 
next: 
1. Introduction to New Institutionalism (Chapter 1). 
2. Introduction to the CAP (Chapter 2) 
3. Application of the theories to explain CAP persistence (Chapter 3). 
4. Overview of previous CAP reforms (Chapter 4). 
5. Application of the theories to explain and predict CAP reforms (Chapter 5). 
 
Most emphasis will be put on the last of these sections, according for the bulk 
of the analysis. The previous sections form a necessary foundation for the insights 
and conclusions presented.  
1.3 Methodology  
This thesis takes the form of a theoretical case study, where the CAP is the object 
of studying and New Institutionalism is the applied theory (Teorell & Svensson, 
2007, p.236). As the question implies, the investigation is restricted to examine 
the possibility of reforms making the CAP less trade distorting, not necessarily 
implying a reduction in the size of its budget.  
A case study usually implies, a case of what? When moving up the ladder of 
abstraction, we cannot simply regard the CAP as any agricultural policy, as it is 
unique in this respect due to its location on a supranational and not a national 
level. Thus, it is beneficial to consider it as a case of a supranational EU-policy as 
well. Comparisons with other agricultural policies and other supranational policies 
will be made, underlining similarities and differences (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, 
p.42).  
Relevant concepts will be properly defined. Central in any concept formation 
is accuracy in definitions, to avoid ambiguity and vagueness (Teorell & Svensson, 
2007, p.37). “Trade-distorting elements”, for example, has too wide a scope and 
must be pinned down (Badersten, 2006, p.86). 
The thesis puts use of secondary sources of various kinds, three categories of 
academic literature being used simultaneously: theoretical literature regarding 
New Institutionalism, empirical literature regarding the CAP, and literature 
regarding the CAP where New Institutionalism is applied. To this we add web 
sites and news articles as well as some primary oral sources (Teorell & Svensson, 
2007, p.89-91). 
All sources are put to critical scrutiny, and, whenever there are diverging 
opinions, both sides of the situation are accounted for to avoid bias (Teorell & 
Svensson, 2007, p.104). The author is explicit with his own interpretations of 
issues when this is necessary (Gilljam et al, 2007, p.318-323), following the 
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demand for intersubjectivity; that the line of reasoning is available to others than 
the author (Badersten, 2006, p.73-75).  
The conclusion will inevitably have an element of speculation to it. It will 
however be firmly grounded on theoretical and empirical underpinnings. 
Obviously, research on future developments can be hazardous. This is however 
not the stock market, but a field in which, as we shall see, history should provide 
valuable insight on future developments. The conclusion may not once and for all 
answer our question, but will still correspond properly to it, making it possible for 
others to evaluate the line of reasoning  (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p.278-280). 
A considerable amount of the analysis will discuss the drivers and tools 
necessary for successful reforms. Drivers signify the events, external or internal, 
small or large, that have contributed to the build up of a demand or need for 
reform. For successful reforms to come about, one must also take into 
consideration the tools available for reform. Generally, these tools have been 
introduced in previous reform attempts, and greatly influence, and constrain, 
reform options. The theoretical underpinnings facilitate the understanding of this 
driver-tool interaction. 
An assessment of the explanatory power of our theories is justifiable to further 
our understanding of which of them are the most relevant for future academic 
explorations in the same sphere. A brief account of the theories and their strengths 
and weaknesses in explaining inertia of and change to the CAP will be presented. 
1.4 New Institutionalism 
This thesis makes the claim that both persistence of and changes to the CAP are to 
a large part a function of the rules and procedures governing this policy. This 
points to the relevance of the New Institutionalist School for understanding our 
object of studying, as the school claims “the organization of political life makes a 
difference” (March & Olsen, 1984, p.747).  
In the New Institutionalist view, organizations and individuals alike are actors 
in a game where institutions constitute the rules. Informal rules, such as norms 
and social conventions, are generally considered as important as formal rules in 
shaping the behavior of actors, and seemingly neutral procedures embody values, 
interests and identities. New Institutionalism insists that institutions are not 
isolated, but embedded in a context of other institutions, underlining for example 
the consequences of institutional choices made in the past, and the interaction 
between institutional rules at different hierarchical levels (Lowndes, 2002, p.97ff). 
New Institutionalism has grown into three overlapping yet fairly distinctive 
branches: Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), Sociological Institutionalism 
(SI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI). The branches developed independently 
of one another in the 1960s and 1970s, as a response to the dominating 
perspectives in social sciences at the time (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.5). 
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1.4.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) 
RCI attributes political outcomes to the combination of individual choices and 
institutions serving as the “rules of the game”. Institutions produce structure-
induced equilibriums, ruling political alternatives as permissible or impermissible, 
structuring voting and veto power of actors, and providing for lower transaction 
costs. Legislators design political institutions in order to further their agendas. 
Institutions provide incentives to act, solve the collective action dilemma, and 
constrain the choices that actors can make (Pollack, 2004, p.138, Lowndes, 2002, 
p.95). They develop from voluntary agreement and survive because they provide 
more benefits to the concerned actors than do alternative institutional forms (Hall 
& Taylor, 1996, p.12). 
The actor is considered to have fixed preferences and behave in a strategic 
manner to maximize his attainment after a calculation affected by how other 
actors within the institutional context are expected to act (Hall & Taylor, 1996, 
p.12, p.18). Institutions do not produce behavior or shape preferences; rather, they 
influence the actor’s behavior by affecting the “structure of a situation” in which 
strategies are chosen (Lowndes, 2002, p.95). For example, in the Council of 
Ministers, the ministers will apply different strategies if the voting rules are those 
of unanimity or those of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). The interaction 
between institutions and actors thus shape the outcomes of negotiations 
(Lynggaard, 2007, p.37). 
As this account suggests, RCI is related to certain branches in economics, and 
thus concepts like property rights, rent seeking and transaction costs form part of 
the vocabulary (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.11). 
RCI has been criticized for seeing the creation of institutions as a highly 
purposeful result of a contractual agreement between rather equal parties, and for 
explaining the origins of institutions largely in the effects that follow from their 
existence (Pierson, 2000, p.263, Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.19). The assumption that 
current institutions are the most efficient to perform a given task might be the case 
for private firms due to market constraints, say the critics, but less so in the 
political sphere (Pollack, 1996, p.433). 
1.4.2 Sociological Institutionalism (SI) 
Contrary to RCI, in the SI view institutions affect the underlying preferences and 
identities of actors, as even highly instrumental actors choose strategies from 
culturally specific repertoires. Institutions are defined broadly, besides formal and 
informal rules also referring to symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral 
templates. No real divide exists between institutions and culture, or between 
cultural and institutional explanations. Institutions specify what an actor can or 
should do but also what he could imagine doing (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.14ff).  
When an actor behaves according to a social convention, he not only 
constitutes himself as a social actor, but also reinforces the convention. The 
concept of “rational action” is thus socially constructed. Institutions are created 
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because they enhance the social legitimacy of organizations or participants, even 
though they may be highly dysfunctional (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.14ff).They are 
resistant to redesign because they structure the choices that an actor is likely to 
make (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.6). 
Social appropriateness is a central concept in understanding the development 
of institutions, implying that an actor’s behavior is dependent of his conception of 
reality (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.15).  
As Scott (2001, p.57) claims: “Compliance occurs in many circumstances 
because other types of behavior are inconceivable; routines are followed because 
they are taken for granted as ‘the way we do these things’.” There is however 
room for actors to make conscious choices and interpret the values set by the 
institution, “since values are never unambiguous and all embracing” (Lynggaard, 
2005, p.66).  
Critics of SI claim that it puts to much focus on the macro-level, and that there 
is a risk that the actor disappears in the process (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.21). 
1.4.3 Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
The emphasis of HI lies on the effects of institutions over time. By scouring the 
historical record for evidence, HI is said to add a realism and complexity that RCI 
analyses lack (Hall &Taylor, 1996, p.17), rejecting functionalist explanations for 
institutional design where institutions are established and maintained because they 
efficiently perform the functions for their creators in the present (Pollack, 2004, 
p.141). 
Institutional persistence can be explained in both a rational calculus manner 
and a cultural manner, and thus either in accordance with RCI or with SI (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p.6). Creators are strong in an initial position, but the institutional 
reform they carry out transform their own and their successors’ positions in 
unanticipated or undesired ways (Pierson, 1996, p.126-131). An institution can 
affect the behavior of the actors who established it. Institutional choices can 
become “locked-in”, and are more or less resistant to change (Pollack, 2004, 
p.139)
1
. 
Political institutions are characterized by increasing returns, where the 
benefits of a policy, and thereby the costs of exit, increase over time (Pierson, 
2000, p.251). This creates incentives to stick with the status quo and only briefly 
adapt institutions to changing political conditions
2
. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1
 The case of EU social policy is a telling example. Social policy is generally considered an area where the 
control of member states remains unchallenged since they jealously protect social policy prerogatives. But there 
are exceptions where member states have lost control of the evolution of aspects of this sector on the EU level. 
Gender equality, workplace health and safety, and the Maastricht social protocol are three compelling examples 
(Pierson, 1996, p.148-156). 
2
 Just like RCI, HI draws on concepts from economic scholars, who apply the increasing returns arguments to 
technology. Four features of technology generate increasing returns: a) large set-up or fixed costs, b) learning 
effects, c) coordination effects (for example software together with hardware), and d) adaptive expectations (the 
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Herein lies the seed for path-dependence: early decisions provide incentives 
for actors to perpetuate institutional choices even when the outcomes are 
inefficient. Once you start down a path the cost of reversal is high, and the 
probability of future steps along the same path increases with each step, as “the 
branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow” (Pierson, 2000, 
p.252). 
A critical juncture is the decisive moment that provides the institutional 
context for events that occur later, ergo a moment that opens up a new path and 
changes the course of history. Small events can serve as critical junctures and may 
thus have large consequences, as early events are more important for shaping 
outcomes than latter. Courses of action can eventually become almost impossible 
to reverse. However, political developments can change once again, as a path is 
broken by a new critical juncture (Pierson, 2000, p.251). 
HI is said to be less careful than other perspectives in specifying causal chains 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.17). Pierson emphasizes the methodological problems 
originating from “many variables and few cases”, which makes hypotheses 
difficult to test (Pierson, 2000, p.264). Moravcsik claims that HI is often based on 
secondary sources with misleading claims about unintended consequences from 
governments who renounce responsibility by making the EU a scapegoat for 
unpopular results, for example in the case of large CAP surpluses (Moravcsik, 
1998, p.491). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
self-fulfilling character of expectations) (Pierson, 2000, p.254). Nobel Price Laureate Douglas North claims that 
the same four features apply to institutions. In addition, several aspects of the political sphere make it 
particularly conducive to increasing returns. While flexibility in markets makes individual choices possible, in 
politics my actions are dependent on those of others, according to the “logic of collective action” by which 
political goods are public goods. There is often a winner-take-all-character to politics, which means that since 
there is rarely room for alternative “firms”, actors adjust their behavior after how others might act, which 
essentially results in organizational persistence from positive feedback. Once established, institutional 
constrains often apply to everyone and are often backed up by force. The exit option from a political institution 
is often unavailable or costly. Political institutions also increase power asymmetries and render power less 
visible, which further reinforces the path-dependence. A balanced conflict is transformed into an uneven power 
relationship where open political conflict is unnecessary (Pierson, 2000, p.257-260).  
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2 The CAP - An introduction 
2.1 Origin, Purpose and Consequences 
The CAP incorporated the model of state intervention in agricultural markets with 
Article 39 in the Treaty of Rome from 1958 (Skogstad, 1998, p.469). Like most 
Agricultural Policies, it was designed to guarantee the attainment of three 
interrelated goals. First, to make it possible for agricultural producers to keep 
incomes close to the level of other social groups. Second, to protect consumers 
against large swings in world market food prices. Third, to achieve self-
sufficiency in food production (Wickman, 2002, p.5).  
Only vaguely sketched in the Treaty, the CAP became the major negotiation 
issue among the founding members of the EC during the 1960s, substituting their 
national agricultural policies for a common policy (Moravcsik, 1998, p.159, Elliot 
& Heath, 2000, p.42). 
As all critical issues had to be resolved by unanimity, recalcitrant governments 
where in a strong position. Opposite of what the Commission had originally 
proposed, the outcome was a policy with high support prices and high external 
protection close to the level of the German agricultural policy, a broad coverage, 
few incentives for structural adjustment, and a decentralized control exercised by 
the Council of Agricultural Ministers (CoAM) (Moravcsik, 1998, p.208-210).   
The Treaty of Rome stipulated that future decisions concerning the level of 
protection be taken on the basis of QMV, but after French insistence an informal 
agreement was reached in the Luxembourg Compromise to use unanimity. This 
insulated an institutional apparatus with lose budget constraints (Moravcsik, 1998, 
p.213-216). 
France initially opposed British accession for fear of them blocking generous 
financing of the CAP. Germany’s wish for high domestic prices as well as 
France’s desire for large export subsidies created an incentive to “lock-in” or 
consolidate this cooperation through new institutions. Permanent financing of 
agriculture was written into the acquis communautaire in the early 1970s 
(Moravcsik, 1998, p.309). With the CAP “irreversibly established” the UK was 
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invited, under condition that the new member state refrain to call the policy into 
question (Moravcsik, 1998, p.191)
3
. 
The size of the CAP budget has steadily grown and now hovers around !43 
billion annually (“Q&A: Common Agricultural Policy”, 20/11/2008). The 
magnitude of the policy also manifests itself in the dominance of agricultural 
legislation over other EU domains (Fligstein & Stone Sweet, 2001, p.44). 
The CAP uses three primary tools to achieve its targets (Borell & Hubbard, 
2000, p.18):  
1. Import tariffs, blocking the bulk of imports from outsiders, thus effectively 
raising EU food prices by removing competition. Food prices are 80-100% higher 
within the Union than they would have been under a free-market regime. This 
transformed the EU in less than 20 years from a food-importer to a food-exporter 
(Wickman, 2002, p.3).  
2. Direct subsidies to farmers. Historically these subsidies have been tied to 
production, thus further encouraging the overproduction (Wickman, 2002, p.3). 
3. Exports subsidies, making it possible for EU-producers to “dump” their 
surpluses on the world market at well below world market price, thus hurting non-
EU-producers’ ability to compete (Borell & Hubbard, 2000, p.20ff). The EU 
stands for 90% of the export subsidies of OECD countries (WB1, p.125). 
Studies confirm that EC protection generally favors vested private interests 
over public (Messerlin, 2001, p.53). The CAP is in essence a compensation 
mechanism for the agricultural sector, favoring small producer groups over larger 
consumer and foreign interests (Laffan et al, 2000, p.92, Borell & Hubbard, 2000, 
p.26). 
The OECD estimates that EU agriculture absorbs a total value of !90 billion 
per year. Of these, the transfer of resources from consumers to producers amounts 
to !40 billion (OECD1). In a “conservative” estimate, the cost of EC protection 
for all farm products represents at least 12 percent of the total farm value added 
(Messerlin, 2001, p.51). 
Nevertheless, farmers’ incomes have gradually fallen compared to those of 
other social groups - the policy has thus ironically succeeded in self-sufficiency 
and (high) price stability but failed in protecting the income of the majority of 
farmers (WB1, p.107-108). 
Other countries are hurt from being shut out from the European market and 
from the dumping of agricultural products. In this respect, the CAP contradicts the 
Unions aim of promoting growth in developed countries, contributing to the view 
of EU as a major source of disruption and instability on global agricultural 
markets (Smith, 2008, p.65, Borell &Hubbard, 2000, p.26). The CAP is perceived 
as going against the interests of the Union’s consumers, of outsiders trying to 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3
 The goal of French president Charles de Gaulle was to seduce the other member governments to believe that he 
was pro-European long enough to “lock-in” in the agricultural integration, since he believed that France could not 
afford to subsidize its agricultural sector alone (Moravcsik, 1998, p.177-183).  
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export to the EU, and of the entire world trading community (Wickman, 2002, 
p.25).  
2.2 Trade-distortion 
There is an element of contagion to protectionist policies: Other countries may 
feel forced to take similar measures to protect their producers (Wickman, 2002, 
p.16f). Agriculture has been at the core of the problems in current and previous 
trade negotiation rounds, where a significant number of countries regard 
liberalization of food trade as one of the most important issues. The Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (URAA) was held up for three years due to disagreement 
over agricultural trade (Josling, 1998, p.iiv). Negotiations in the Current Doha 
Development Round (DDR) broke down in July 2008 after failure to reach a 
compromise on agricultural imports (BBC1).  
The reforms that this paper aims to suggest should remove the trade distorting 
elements of the CAP. We follow the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
providing a definition of trade-distortion. In essence, reforms should make 
subsidies compatible with the so-called Green box-criteria of the negotiations in 
the WTO. According to the WTO, subsidies that comply with the Green box “are 
not targeted at particular products, and include direct income supports for farmers 
that are not related to (are ‘decoupled’ from) current production levels or prices. 
They also include environmental protection and regional development 
programmes” (WTO1). To this we add the dismantling of the trade distorting 
export subsidies and import tariffs accounted for above. 
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3 Explaining CAP inertia 
3.1 Rules on different levels 
New Institutionalism focuses on the interaction between institutional rules at 
different levels, like “operational” day-to-day rules and “constitutional rules”, the 
latter affecting how rules on lower hierarchical levels are made (Lowndes, 2002, 
p.101). Kay identifies three different institutional levels: the constitutional level, 
the collective choice/policy decision level, and the operational level of individual 
decisions. He criticizes institutional scholars to focus only on the highest level 
where the rate of institutional change is very low, thereby missing many 
institutional changes (Kay, 2003, p.407).  
The concepts that New Institutionalism emphasizes manifest themselves in 
different ways depending on the institutional level. National constitutions for 
example, involving high start up costs and large adaptive effects, cannot easily 
change, thus being prone to increasing returns, inertia and path-dependence 
(Pollack, 2004, p.140). 
Persistence of institutions appears particularly prominent in the EU, especially 
for the most radical institutional design: a Treaty amendment, a difficult and 
unpredictable process. Institutions and policies on a lower hierarchical level can 
have lower fixed costs, fewer adaptive effects and lower institutional barriers to 
change. Nevertheless, since even modest changes in existing EU policies often 
require unanimity or QMV, the threshold for change can remain high (Pierson, 
1996, p.143f). 
3.2 The decision-making procedure 
Discussing changes to the CAP requires understanding of the decision-making 
procedure in this branch of EU policy. Below follows a stylized account. 
The agricultural commissioner makes a proposal together with his cabinet and 
the agricultural directorate-general of the Commission (DG-VI). The proposal is 
presented for the Commission, who either adopts or rejects it. If it is the former, it 
is forwarded to the Council of Agriculture Ministers (CoAM) who has to adopt 
the proposal by unanimity, even though it is stated in the treaty that agricultural 
decisions are to be taken by QMV. As mentioned, this manner of social 
appropriateness is a result of the Luxembourg Compromise from 1966, which 
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stated that if a policy is of vital national interest to a member state, unanimity 
applies (Ritson & Harvey, 1997, p.61-66). 
Many blame the maintenance of unanimity on France alone, but Germany and 
the Benelux countries quietly opposed the use of QMV until the 1980s 
(Moravcsik, 1998, p.488). This informal veto opportunity makes agreements more 
difficult to reach, as the proposal must represent the lowest common denominator 
of the member states (Skogstad, 1998, p.479). 
The constitutionalization of the CAP is an important feature that we can stress 
using the SI perspective. Ideas that are embedded in an institution and 
“surrounded by a protective belt of other policies, institutions and/or social groups 
are more resilient in the face of challenge than other ideas not similarly 
institutionally fortified” (Skogstad, 1998, p.464). A constitutional amendment 
would require unanimity in the Council of Ministers and afterwards ratification 
either by national parliaments or by referendums in each member country 
(Skogstad, 1998, p.479). 
3.2.1 The Joint-Decision Trap 
RCI scholars have launched the concept of a Joint-Decision Trap (JDT), a 
function of certain types of decision rules on the Community level, under which a 
given policy is likely to remain in place even in the face of a changing 
environment. Three conditions must apply within the decision-making rules in 
order for a JDT to occur (Pollack, 1996, p.440):  
1. Intergovernmental decision-making, as opposed to federal or supranational 
decision-making. The CAP being in the first pillar, the role of the national 
interests in the CoAM is bigger than in supranational organizations such as the 
European Parliament or the Commission (Elliot & Heath, 2000, p.42ff).  
2. Decision-making by a voting rule of unanimity, as opposed to a 
majoritarian voting rule. As mentioned, the Luxembourg compromise meant that 
unanimity became the norm for CAP decisions. This results in a pathological 
situation where a single member state can block reforms (Pollack, 1996, p.440). 
Of course, agreements on institutional reform are not impossible, as the required 
consensus may be achieved by compromise and issue-linkage (Grant, 2003, p.23).  
3. A status quo “default condition”, where a policy or institution persists in the 
event of no agreement. If not for the default condition, unanimity would actually 
favor exit from policies
4
.  
It is important to stress that the JDT applies not only to policies like the CAP 
but also to the institutions themselves since they require unanimity to amend 
(Pollack, 1996, p.441f). There is thus a JDT both at the constitutional level and at 
the policy level. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4
 This is the case with the EU structural funds, which must be reauthorized at periodic intervals (Elliot & Heath, 
2000, p.42ff). 
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Inertia is of course not always negative, and can also be intentional. Political 
institutions can be explicitly designed to be difficult to overturn because those 
who design them wish to bind their successors in order to protect themselves from 
“political uncertainty”, or to bind themselves, for reasons of “credible 
commitment”, to remove a certain option from the future menu (Pierson, 2000, 
p.262). 
3.3 Other factors behind CAP persistence  
3.3.1 Rent-seekers 
Institutions are fundamental in shaping the behavior of actors; if, for example, 
they create incentives for piracy, people will become pirates (Pierson, 2000, 
p.256). Less dramatically, if institutions create incentives for farming, people will 
become farmers. 
HI and RCI stress the effect of CAP-specific micro-level-mechanisms on 
interest groups. Political moves create rents (gains) that encourage rent-seekers to 
mobilize for the maintenance of a program (Kay, 2003, p.412). Rent-seekers see 
the EU as a rational location for redistributive programmes since competition 
between redistributive regimes lead to their demise on the national level as 
national governments compete for investments by lowering taxes and scaling 
down redistribution. As such, the EU can be viewed as a cartel preventing 
institutional competition (Elliot & Heath, 2000, p.42). Centralization protects 
subsidies from electoral competition, since it moves spending to an unaccountable 
authority (Wickman, 2002, p.31). 
The relative influence of the farm lobby is high mainly due to the logic of 
collective action: individuals will only contribute to a cause if their net gain of the 
preferred outcome is greater than the opportunity cost of taking part (Elliot & 
Heath, 2000, p.42). There are about 150 agricultural groups established in the EU, 
with COPA
5
 serving as a powerful umbrella organization in Brussels, maintaining 
a close relation to the DG-IV. COPA has a constitutional right to consultation on 
CAP-decisions, in an arrangement once summed up by a Commission official: 
“the Commission only proposes and the Council will only agree what it knows 
COPA will accept” (Elliot & Heath, 2000, p.42). 
Many scholars do not give COPA a significant role in reform processes. There 
is some evidence that the farm lobby’s influence is not exclusive anymore, 
perhaps because there is no longer a clearly circumscribed agricultural agenda 
without obvious external effects (Kay, 2003, p.409-410). 
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 Comité des Organisations Professionelles Agricoles de la Communauté Européenne. 
  13 
But this could overlook that COPA enjoys the power to circumscribe the range 
of reform options by increasing the cost of adopting alternative policies (Kay, 
2003, p.413). Some scholars insist that politicians dare not underestimate the 
power of the farmers, and that particularly the French position in favor of status 
quo can be explained by fear of the consequences in the next election (Wickman, 
2002, p.25).  
Policies transform future possibilities by shifting the overall state capacity in a 
specific direction (Kay, 2003, p.412). The CAP has lead to the development of 
policy specific administrative skills, technological knowledge and management 
systems. The cost of switching policies favors a status quo in the Commission and 
among member states. Commitments and investments made by individual actors 
on basis of certain policies increase the costs of a new policy. The CAP has more 
or less forced farmers to make decisions with considerable sunk costs, like 
growing certain grains. There is a threat of political backlash and policy chaos if 
farmers do not agree with reform outcomes (Kay, 2003, p.413). 
3.3.2 Norms 
SI underscores the importance of cultural norms within the institutional context. 
One of these is the principle of collegiality nurtured by the commissioners, 
implying that all decisions taken in the Commission should be collegial. The 
Commission is collectively responsible for all decisions and every commissioner 
has to support the decision in public, which means that internal conflicts 
concerning sensitive issues need to be resolved beforehand. Of course, the 
bargaining is rarely of the same magnitude as in the Council, the main arena for 
defending national interests (Grant, 1997, p.160). 
Another important concept that SI can help shed light on is that of agricultural 
exceptionalism. Historically, agriculture has in many countries been considered as 
an area where state intervention is justified. Farmers were perceived as having 
specific needs and interests, and farming seen as contributing to broader national 
goals. This perception was taken into consideration in the GATT agreement of 
1947; agriculture was institutionalized as a specific sector, where a different set of 
rules applied in international trade (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2008, p.631f).  
While in the United States the needs of farmers have been the most 
emphasized, the idea of agriculture contributing to a public good has been equally 
prominent in Europe. Skogstad sees this is as the reason why agricultural 
exceptionalism has persisted in the EU, as the CAP has been able to take on 
additional goals to justify itself, such as promoting rural society and 
environmental protection, curbing depopulation of the countryside, and 
maintaining a preferred social order. On the contrary, in the US, where the public 
good was never emphasized, agricultural exceptionalism now has few adherents, 
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due to the perception that farmers have no special needs, and that payments go to 
millionaires (Skogstad, 1998, p.477).
6
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6
 Edwards (2007) asserts that in 2005, the average income of U.S. farm households was 26 percent higher than 
the average for all U.S. households. “Farm subsidies are welfare for the well–to–do — even millionaire farmland 
owners such as David Rockefeller and Edgar Bronfman receive farm subsidies (…) the vast majority of farm 
subsidies go to the largest farms. In recent years, the biggest 10 percent of farm businesses have received 72 
percent of farm subsidies, according to the Environmental Working Group.”  
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4 Reforms 
Initially the CAP was seen as proof that cooperation at the supranational level was 
possible. Voices of criticism were nevertheless raised already in the 1960s, mainly 
over the costs of storing the surplus and the excess use of soil (Dinan, 1999, 
p.339). 
Demands for reform became louder in the late 1970s and 1980s, in view of 
increasing costs, environmental effects, overproduction and the dumping of the 
excess supply (Delayen, 2007, p.1). However, early reform attempts failed - for 
example, pushing through the second Mansholdt plan in 1968 resulted in farmer 
riots and life threats against commissioner Mansholdt, and in the end the Council 
rejected the Commission’s liberalization proposal (Moravcsik, 1998, p.217). 
The CAP reached its budget ceiling in 1983, which led to the introduction of 
the milk quotas in 1984, in order to curb production and costs. 1988 saw an 
introduction of environmental and structural measures into the CAP structural 
policy. The priority of rural support was elevated and environmental sustainability 
introduced. At the same time, the Stabilizers Package imposed budgetary 
discipline limits on agricultural market support and penalties to producers for 
over-production (Skogstad, 1998, p.471). 
At first glance, the CAP appears to be an ideal case study of path-dependence 
since the basic objectives were decided already in the Treaty of Rome and the 
changes in the policy amounted to moderate adjustments of the existing policy 
until the 1990s (Kay, 2003, p.408). 
4.1 The MacSharry Reforms  
The MacSharry reforms in 1992, named after the agricultural commissioner at the 
time, were different from previous attempts. The reforms consisted of cuts in 
support prices to farmers by a third, in order to curb the overproduction resulting 
from support being tied to production. Direct income payments to farmers based 
on acreage were introduced as a compensation for these cuts. This model, 
replacing production support with direct payments, is called decoupling 
(Skogstad, 1998, p.472, Kay, 2003, p.413f). 
At the same time, a set-a-side scheme was created, under which farmers were 
compensated to take 15% of their land out of production. The MacSharry reforms 
succeeded where previous attempts to substantially cut the level of support prices 
to farmers had failed. However, as the decoupling was only partial, incentives for 
overproduction remained (Kay, 2003, p.413f). 
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4.2 The Agenda 2000 reforms  
The Agenda 2000 reforms continued the decoupling. The reforms had a second 
element to them, the introduction of a new Rural Development Pillar of the CAP, 
which was given 10% of the CAP budget (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2006, p.53). 
This transfer of funds from Pillar I to Pillar II is called modulation. The result, an 
only partial compensation to farmers for price cuts, was important as it broke the 
link between specific price cuts and specific compensation in the form of direct 
payments. 
That some felt disappointed in view of the modest progress of Agenda 2000 is 
understandable, as the initial grand-scale plan was to adjust EU-prices to the 
world market level, open up the EU market, abolish export subsidies and decouple 
subsidies from production (Rojas, 2004, p.8).  
The German Chancellor Gerard Schröder also suggested a partial re-
nationalization of the financing of agricultural subsidies in which the member 
states finance 25% themselves, as common financing essentially follows the same 
logic as visitors in a restaurant who eat more if they share the bill. Despite a 
majority of member states being in favor of Schröder’s suggestion, the unanimity 
requirement for decisions resulted in a preservation of the status quo (Elliot & 
Heath, 2000, p.45f). 
4.3 The Mid-Term Review  
The Agenda 2000 opened up for the Mid-term review (MTR) of 2003, initiated by 
agricultural commissioner Fischler (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2006, p.53). The 
MTR continued the decoupling of direct payments to farmers so that they receive 
support independently of production. As before, farmers were compensated for 
these cuts, this time based on historical reference for the period 2000-2002 
(Dinan, 1999, p.2). 
This attempt, called the Single Farm Payments, meant that farmers could 
produce almost anything they wanted, provided they keep their land in good 
agricultural and environmental condition (so-called cross-compliance). However, 
the decoupling had a voluntary aspect to it, whereby countries could still keep 
some subsidies linked with limited production or decouple all payments (Delayen, 
2007, p.2). The result was an element of “re-nationalization”: a complex set of 
different decoupling scenarios (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2006, p.56).  
Modulation also continued, however more modestly than Fischler had 
envisaged. The limited shift of funds to rural development still helped to 
legitimize the reforms to the EU public (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2006, p.58, 
p.61) and was also a measure to make subsidies more compatible with WTO-
arrangements (Grant, 2003, p.21). 
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Small farmers were critical of the fact that payments were based on the period 
2000-2002, as this still meant that large farms receive the bulk of funds (Delayen, 
2007, p.3). Goodison claims ”the new system will effectively freeze in place, 
under the new nominally less trade-distorting system, the trade distortions 
generated under the old system” (Goodison, 2003, p.5).  
Also, like prior reforms, the EU only met the international demands when it 
came to reducing domestic support, while doing nothing to eliminate the 
“particularly disturbing” export subsidies nor significantly reduce the import 
tariffs (Grant, 2003, p.21). Thus reforms did little to appease international critics 
(Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2006, p.59). 
4.4 The Health Check  
The Health Check in November 2008 essentially followed the spirit of previous 
reforms. Close to all payments were decoupled, with the exception of a few areas, 
were member states could still do as they liked. Direct payments were decreased 
to some extent, with the money being transferred to Pillar II; the rate of 
modulation would be raised from 5% at present to 10% by 2012. A timeline was 
also set for abolishing the milk quotas, one of the few areas where there were still 
limits to production, thus contributing to an artificially high price on dairy 
products (Delayen, 2007, p.3). The quotas are to be raised each year, to expire 
completely in 2015 (BBC2).   
Interestingly enough, the agreement was made on the basis of QMV. Indeed, 
French Farm Minister Michel Barnier said the reforms were backed by ‘virtual 
unanimity’ (Farmpolicy1) but as a commentator closely following the hard all-
night negotiations leading up to the compromise put it, “(u)nanimity, like 
pregnancy, has a binary quality. A decision can’t be ‘virtually unanimous’” 
(CHC1). 
The UK was among the countries opposing the deal, feeling the new measures 
did not go far enough. “We see this as a lost opportunity for the EU to introduce 
further reforms to the CAP budget at a faster pace”, a British spokesman said to 
AFP (AFP1). 
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5 Analysis: Explaining and predicting 
reforms  
5.1 When do institutions change? 
According to RCI, there are three main policy windows for institutional change 
(Pollack, 1996, p.438f):  
1. A change in the policy environment posing clear new challenges to the 
existing institutional forms.  
2. A change in the constitution of actors or the relative powers of actors since 
the design of an existing institution changes.  
3. An improvement in the quality of information, and thus a decrease in 
uncertainty about the operation of institutions or about the environment within 
which they operate. 
As we have seen, however, EC institutions are generally highly resistant to 
change due to high informational and institutional barriers. But environmental and 
other changes can still lead to the necessary preference convergence. We then face 
a punctuated equilibrium: A long period of stability when pressures mount is 
followed by sudden, infrequent institutional changes. The most typical and large-
scale of these in the Union are the Treaty amendments - changes on the 
constitutional level (Pollack, 1996, p.438f).  
These outcomes are likely to be lowest-common-denominator 
intergovernmental bargains. Any change is difficult, and it is equally difficult to 
roll integration back due to the accumulative structure of the treaties. The result of 
reforms will be different from the result if the bargain had been made from 
scratch. Institutional choices in the past shape both the day-to-day process and the 
subsequent choices of institutional and constitutional change (Pollack, 1996, 
p.438f). 
There are inarguably moments in politics when path exits do occur and 
politics change directions. Pierson (2000, p.263f) stresses the need to focus on 
these critical junctures, triggering events that changed or may change the course 
of history. As mentioned, “large outcomes” do not necessarily spring from “large 
events” according to New Institutionalism. This said, Pierson himself states that 
junctures are often the result of  “big events”, such as exogenous shocks.  
Hall and Taylor claim that many HI scholars attribute critical junctures to 
economic crisis or military conflicts, which are instrumental in bringing about a 
rupture in the current path, inevitably changing directions. They add however that 
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many HI scholars do not have a well-developed answer to what precipitates such 
junctures (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.10). 
5.2 Radical reforms? 
Could CAP reforms seek inspiration from other countries? New Zeeland, 
previously highly protectionist in agriculture, chose to implement radical reforms 
in the 1980s, abolishing a large portion of its farm program. Prior to the reforms 
New Zeeland had support systems similar to those of the EU with total support to 
farmers on 32,7% of the total value of farm production in the early 1980s. This 
figure had come down to 2,3% one decade later. In 2001, direct production 
support was only 0.5% in New Zeeland, compared to 39.6% in the EU. Rather 
counterintuitively, the reforms were followed by an astounding productivity 
development in the farming sector. Farmers’ share of GDP increased and only one 
percent left the industry, underscoring that there is “a life after subsidies” 
(Johnson, 2000 and WB1 p.132).  
Based on this development, Scrimgeour and Pasour (1996) present a set of 
four interrelated policy recommendations to countries wishing to deregulate their 
agriculture. The recommendations are presented in italics, followed by the 
author’s comments in regular font. 
1) The importance of ideas. Scientists play an important educational role in 
changing the political and intellectual climate in favor of reform.  
However, as Daugbjerg has asserted, the welfare gains of radical reforms of 
the CAP are well known, but this does not seem to be sufficient in order to initiate 
them (Daugbjerg, 1999, p.410). 
2) Simultaneous restructuring of other sectors. A deregulated sector will 
become more prone to accept the outcome if it can benefit from the economic 
gains of the deregulation of other sectors.  
Yet the EU-budget is small compared to national budgets, and the CAP 
accounts for a vast proportion of it. There simply are not that many other areas 
that could be deregulated simultaneously on the EU-level.  
3) An emphasis of transitionality. The effects of eliminating farm programs 
appear disastrous in the short run, however the New Zeeland experience shows 
that in the long run the profitability of the farm sector remained intact. 
As Beghin et al (2003) show, this is true to a limited extent when it comes to a 
complete abolishment of the CAP. A transition to a free-market regime would be 
lees seamless, and sugar, wheat, and beef production would particularly suffer. 
However, the total net decrease of agriculture in the EU following such a large-
scale reform would not be more than around 13%, large farms being the primary 
losers. 
4) The political process is dependent on the institutional framework - thus, if 
the current “rules of the game” only permit fine tuning it may be necessary to put 
more emphasis on choices among alternative rules. 
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This point is highly relevant concerning the CAP. Grant addresses the need for 
a change in the way policy is made as well as the content of that policy (Grant, 
2003, p.26). The Joint-Decision Trap means that high order rules do not permit 
radical reforms. However, changing the constitutional rules would require a treaty 
amendment, which is a difficult and highly unpredictable process.  
Folkpartiet, a liberal Swedish party, proposed a “Big bang” strategy of CAP-
reform in 2004, under which the CAP should be abolished over a period of three 
years. The proposal drew on the New Zeeland example as well as the idea of re-
nationalization (Rojas, 2004). 
Re-nationalization can be understood as a reinforcement of the power of the 
member states at the expense of the Community decision-making process. It is 
expected to reduce the effect of lobbying by agricultural interests, since they will 
be forced onto a level where voters and taxpayers have more control. If 
agricultural policy were to be decided at the national level, the bias in favor of 
agricultural interests could disappear (Niemi & Kola, 2005, p.35f). 
Folkpartiet is not alone in suggesting this. A report ordered by the Barosso-
commission suggested that agricultural spending at the EU level be reduced to 
one-tenth of its current level, while the redistributive functions of the CAP be 
delegated to member states (Sapir et al, 2003). Wickman has proposed that the 
export subsidies and import duties be removed immediately, with a five-year 
time-span during which the direct subsidies are phased out, something that should 
become a national policy issue. EU federal representatives would guard de-
regulation but no longer distribute subsidies (Wickman, 2002, p.27f). 
In view of the lack of success of such “radical” reform proposals it appears 
that re-nationalization in combination with grand-scale deregulation is unrealistic. 
In fact, it could even be counter-productive if the goal is primarily to make the 
CAP less damaging to world trade, as other options are not explored. How to 
accomplish these reforms is rarely touched upon in the literature reviewed, 
probably because no one has been able to present a realistic solution to 
overcoming the problems with the JDT and an eventual Treaty Amendment. 
Scharpf has stated that the obvious remedy for the JDT would be majority voting. 
However the best the EU has achieved so far in this respect is the use of QMV in 
some areas (Scharpf, 2006, p.848f). 
Drawing on HI, we will discuss lessons learned from previous reform attempts 
in order to increase our understanding of what we can hope to accomplish when it 
comes to reforms in the desirable direction. Two questions should be particularly 
explored. First, what have been the drivers of previous reforms? Second, which 
tools have been (or been made) available to make reforms successful? 
5.3 Reform Drivers 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2006, p.49-50) provide an overview of the debate 
between those claiming that mounting budget costs triggered the MacSharry 
reforms in 1992, and those who see the then ongoing GATT-negotiations as the 
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primary driver. Moyer (2004) appears as the firmest proponent of the first 
position, claiming that budget issues have been behind all reforms of agricultural 
policies in the EU and the US. He has even stated that a financial crisis would be 
the most potent impetus for future change of the CAP. 
However, Swedish EU-minister Cecilia Malmström stated that CAP-reform 
will most likely not be an issue during the Swedish EU-presidency this autumn, as 
the prospects of any far-reaching agreement appears small in view of other 
important issues such as the financial crisis and climate change. In her view, the 
current crisis was seen more as an obstacle of reform
7
. 
In another article, Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2008, p.636-641) claim the 
MacSharry reforms were primarily undertaken due to increasing external pressure 
from the GATT negotiations. Grant (2003, p.21) asserts that at least partially 
successful CAP-reforms have been so due to exogenous pressure of various kinds 
that disturbed the current equilibrium, citing the pressure from the Uruguay round 
which led to the MacSharry reforms and the subsequent Agenda 2000 reforms.  
Daugbjerg and Swinbank claim that the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
curbed the agricultural exceptionalism in 1994, mainly for two reasons. First, the 
new “single undertaking” principle governing the URAA meant that it had to be 
accepted as a package deal. Second, while consensus previously prevailed in both 
negotiations and in implementation, the agreement made implementation quasi-
judicial by the “dispute settlement system”, forcing countries to conform to the 
agreement or face sanctions. Thus, the URAA, albeit a deception for those hoping 
for rapid abolishment of agricultural barriers, was a remarkable shift in 
agricultural perception, as the trade negotiations stated that the long-term 
objective would be to establish a market-oriented agricultural system and to 
reduce protection (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2008, p.631f). 
While some are more important the others, several factors contribute to the 
build up of a punctuated equilibrium and demand for reforms. Prior to the 
agreement on the MTR in 2003, Grant listed some of the pressures for reform: 
internal public criticism concerning costs, food safety, environment, the treatment 
of developing countries, and external pressure from the DDR. The 2004 
enlargement, he predicted, meant that the political window to reform was now - 
once the new member countries had joined it would mean more resistance to 
reforms (Grant 2003, p.19). Indeed, Michalski et al (2009) conclude that new 
member states, notably Poland, have given France allies in further reducing the 
attempts to reform the CAP. 
In our assessment it appears that external pressure from the World Trade 
Negotiations is and has been the most important driver of reforms. 
5.4 Reform Tools 
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 When asked by the author during an address held in Lund at Utrikespolitiska Föreningen, 22/4/2009. 
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Kay (2003, p.411-417) claims that the view of reforms as a result of exogenous 
shocks is too static. Path-dependence can explain the cumulative effects of small 
internal policy changes. He asserts that when a critical juncture occurs, the policy 
legacy reinforces policy adaptation in a particular existing direction. He addresses 
the need to answer questions such as how the policy legacy of the CAP is 
weakened, the feedback mechanisms disrupted, and a new path introduced.  
How, he asks, was the nature of the external shocks leading up to the 
MacSharry reforms, the first substantial reforms, different to earlier shocks? And 
secondly, why did the CAP decision-making system adapt differently in 1992 
compared to earlier? In Kays view, the introduction of new, seemingly moderate 
policy instruments or tools can have significant cumulative consequences and 
result in positive feedback loops. Reinforcement mechanisms of a policy can in 
themselves have unintended external effects which produce pressure for change of 
the existing policy path. 
Kay identifies the Stabilizers Reforms in 1988 as a critical juncture whose 
effects became visible with the MacSharry reforms. The stabilizers system “for 
the first time set a five-year budget including a guideline allocation for the CAP”, 
essentially a fiscal constraint combined with automatic penalties for 
overproduction (the so-called co-responsibility levy). The consequences of this, in 
face of particularly good harvests in the coming years, were pressure within the 
CoAM for reform. Thus, the limitation of political options before 1992 was an 
important factor behind the reforms in addition to external shocks such as the 
GATT negotiations. Furthermore, the introduction of direct income payments in 
1992 opened for a reduction over time of direct income payments in a controlled 
manner, as well as for modulation. The MacSharry reforms thus made new tools 
available to future CAP policy-makers, opening up a new path (Kay, 2003, 
p.416f).  
Buckwell asserts that decoupling is a major step in moving domestic EU 
support to the WTO non-trade distorting category of the Green Box (Buckwell, 
2007, p.14). Whether you agree with Kay’s emphasis on the importance of the 
Stabilizers reforms or not, his last point appears relevant; decoupling was 
perceived by a CAP-critic like Rojas to be the key to everything else, as it would 
lead to lower costs for agricultural support, rid the EU of a lot of criticism, and 
open the possibility to push for a firmer free-trade position in the WTO, as an 
entirely decoupled support is in accordance with the non-trade-distorting 
guidelines of the WTO Green box (Rojas, 2004, p.16). 
What then about the transfer of funds to rural development (modulation) - can 
it be seen as another tool available to reduce trade-distortion? With the Agenda 
2000 reforms, this option was institutionalized in the creation of the second Rural 
Development Pillar, and in subsequent reforms further resources have been 
transferred in this direction. Could the creation of Pillar II mean the opening of 
another path? 
The MacSharry Reforms opened the door for support decoupled from 
production, compensated by direct support. The modulation tool furthermore 
broke the link between cuts in production support and compensation. This gradual 
transfer has done little to decrease the CAP budget, but nevertheless funds have 
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moved from trade-distorting areas to areas that are also more easily justifiable in 
face of domestic and external criticism.  
Skogstad claims that while agricultural exceptionalism has gradually 
disappeared in the US, it persists in the EU. This is because in the US protecting 
the farmers has always been the main priority, while in the EU the public benefits 
of agriculture is also emphasized. Thus, when the concern for food security 
declined, the CAP was able to justify its existence by taking on new policy goals, 
such as rural employment and environmental protection (Skogstad, 1998, p.470). 
In this sense, modulation can be seen as a tool to guarantee the survival of the 
CAP. 
Analyzing the MTR, Daugbjerg and Swinbank predicted that the pressure to 
switch funds to Rural Development would continue (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 
2006, p.62). Indeed, direct payments have decreased since 2003 and will continue 
to decrease until 2013, the money instead being earmarked for Pillar II (Delayen, 
2007, p.2). 
Far-reaching reform attempts would indeed have meant a fundamental shift in 
the history of the CAP, had they been successful. The partial re-nationalization 
proposed by Schröder for Agenda 2000 would most likely have formed a critical 
juncture, a prerogative for more of the same in the future (Elliot & Heath, 2000, 
p.45f).  
In this, however, lay also the reason why this was never a realistic option. In 
the SI view, current institutions affect the actors’ perceptions of what is possible, 
and re-nationalization is too much at odds with the actors’ (the Commission, DG-
IV, the CoAM) belief of what the CAP should be, and that is a common, not a 
national policy. Agricultural exceptionalism and the constitutionalization of the 
CAP both favor the perception of agriculture as an area that must be supported 
financially by the EU. 
The Commission has always opposed a re-nationalization of the CAP for fear 
of the consequences on the overall project of European integration (Swinbank & 
Tranter, 2004, p.101). Together with the institutional barriers this makes the 
progress of far-reaching reform proposals close to inconceivable. As we have 
seen, supporters of the status quo are powerful in their recalcitrant positions, and 
have invested so much in the idea of the CAP that they would never agree to 
proposals that in the long run might lead to its abolishment. History has by 
contrast shown them willing to reallocate resources from one agricultural sector to 
another. 
The Swedish government took an offensive position in 2007, demanding that 
all farm and export subsidies be abolished (Local1). According to Sofia Carlsson, 
special adviser at the Swedish agricultural ministry, forwarding this radical 
position is fruitless. In her belief, the CAP will never “disappear”. Instead of 
radical but vain attempts, the aim should be to shift the targets of the policy step-
wise in accordance with the Green box criteria, by reallocation to fields such as 
rural and environmental development
8
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Prior to the Health Check reforms, Buckwell (2007, p.14-16) predicted that 
harmonizing the Single Payment Scheme crated in the MTR would be a priority, 
as ever since a variety of different Single Farm Payments were in operation. There 
was thus a concern among the member states that CAP was becoming re-
nationalized. The Commission pushed for further harmonization of the SPS, a 
goal that was to a large degree achieved in the Health Check.  
Indeed there appears to be a fear of any kind of re-nationalization, and thus a 
delicate balance between moving further resources to Pillar II and the fear of what 
this could amount to if the modulation is in part voluntary. Buckwell believes that 
the balance between pillars I and II will be at the heart of the debate of the future 
purpose of the CAP. The Commission’s vision is that the general path of the CAP 
should be to move even more resources in direction of Pillar II, and that this is to 
be achieved by further compulsory modulation. This is not to say that this is an 
easy task. The Commission has tried to shift more money from market support to 
rural development in both 1999, 2003 and 2008, but with limited success. Delayen 
asserts that 40 billion of the CAP budget of 54,7 billion euros goes to the pillar I 
(Delayen, 2007, p.3).  
Buckwell asks if there is a lack of belief that the correct reform direction is 
towards pillar II, as the consensus appears to crumble when it comes to pushing 
real resources from pillar I (Buckwell, 2007, p.16). 
As is often the case when it comes to EU decision-making, things take time. 
As the following account suggests, modulation could be a necessary insturment 
for achieving successful reforms. 
5.5 Future reform 
The size of the CAP budget is fixed until 2013, when new negotiations will begin. 
UK and the Scandinavian countries have stated that they will strive for a 
substantial reduction of the overall farm subsidy package (AFP1). 
Below, the case will be made that modulation may be a highly instrumental 
tool for furthering reforms of the kind we wish to accomplish. In fact, without this 
tool it is difficult to see how the EU could commit to far-reaching goals in the 
Doha Development Round. 
Our overview of the drivers of CAP-reform concluded that the pressure from 
trade negotiations is among the most prominent. Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2006, 
p.62) predicted that a successful conclusion to the DDR would probably involve 
commitment to eliminate export subsidies and reduce import protection. Indeed, 
the EU has made far-reaching commitments for the event of a successful 
conclusion of the round: “As part of the Doha Round, the EU has offered to cut 
farm tariffs by 60%, reduce trade distorting farm subsidies by 80% and eliminate 
farm export subsidies altogether” (EC1). As the implementation of the agreement 
would be quasi-judicial, the EU would probably have to comply once the 
agreement is signed off. 
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The DDR was stalled in 2008 and there is thus far no news as to when the 
negotiations will recommence. A successful conclusion to the round would serve 
to overcome many of the obstacles for CAP reform and a means to go about 
reforming the export subsidies and the import tariffs, which up until now have 
been left in relative peace in the reform process. 
At the same time, these reforms have to be justified, particularly in the face of 
the agricultural exceptionalism within the CAP policy community and among 
farmers and other citizens who feel that agriculture should be guarded from 
market forces and subject to political support and supervision. Modulation 
provides a means to agree on large-scale reforms of the trade distorting elements 
of the policy while still preserving the legitimacy in the eyes of the concerned 
groups and neutralizing the criticism from vested interests. 
Reform resistance could be appeased by transferring the funds freed from an 
abolishment of the export subsidies to the Rural Development Pillar, were they 
would do less harm from a trade distorting perspective. The share of the EU 
budget devoted to the CAP could thus remain more or less intact. 
Granted, this would still mean a subsidized agricultural sector. But even to 
proponents of a free market it should be evident that this is the lesser of two evils. 
The size of the CAP budget is in fact rather modest when divided over the 
population in the EU. It is the disturbing consequences stemming out from such 
small means that need first and foremost to be remedied. 
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6 Conclusion 
In the beginning of this essay, we posed the following question: 
 
What is the most feasible manner to achieve future reforms of the CAP with 
the purpose to get rid of the trade-distorting elements of the policy? 
 
In essence, reforms remedying the trade-distorting mechanisms can be achieved 
on two levels. Either by completely changing the rules of the game, or by 
changing the cultural obstacles perceived by some member states to reform, by 
handing them an exit strategy. In the author’s view, the second option appears as 
the most feasible, as the historical reform process has in fact provided us with 
such a strategy. 
This paper has suggested that the main driver of past and future reform 
attempts is trade negotiations, although other factors can also contribute to the 
build up of a punctuated equilibrium. Pressures to reform are however not enough.  
This is were the path-dependent process stemming from past reforms have 
provided a tool in form of modulation to the Rural Development Pillar, which can 
help justify reforms. A transfer of the funds released by the reforms to areas 
where they are less trade distorting and perceived as more legitimate, would 
accommodate the need for continued agricultural exceptionalism.  
A combination of pressure from trade negotiations and the use of the internal 
policy tool modulation would thus serve as feasible recipe to accomplish a less 
trade-distorting CAP. In sum, pressure for reform will come from the outside, 
while the instruments guaranteeing their success will come from with in the EU 
institutional system. 
As for our theoretical underpinnings, they can be criticized for failing to 
internalize this external pressure to reform, which is still given exogenously. The 
theories have however served us well in explaining how this external pressure 
must be combined with policy internal processes (the creation of the modulation 
tool) in order for reforms to be successful. 
RCI has been beneficial in helping us understand why the CAP is resistant to 
change (the JDT) and essentially made it possible to dismiss any “Big-bang” 
reform attempt as unrealistic. The functionalist and voluntary aspects of the theory 
in its purest form, with the assumption that institutions persist because they are the 
most efficient in performing their tasks, are however less helpful in explaining 
how change of the CAP can come about.  
SI has provided us with insight into how the CAP is perceived culturally, both 
in the eyes of EU-citizens and their governments. Notably, agricultural 
exceptionalism in its European sense where the public good is emphasized, has 
contributed to both the persistence and evolution of the CAP since the early 
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1990s, by adding new policy goals more justifiable in the eyes of the European 
citizens.  
HI has helped shed light on the tools emanating from the path dependent 
reforms, notably the modulation tools and the limiting of political options, which 
can serve as a means to curb cultural obstacles to reform, and even make SI 
aspects conducive to reform. 
In all, it is the author’s belief that the question posed in the beginning of this 
thesis has been answered in an elaborate and critical manner, taking many 
considerations and diverging opinions into account, while also the New 
Institutionalism perspective to good use. Time will tell if our prediction holds in 
face of future developments. 
6.1 Further Research 
Further research concerning reforms of the CAP would benefit much from 
combining HI and SI, even though the picture might become fragmented without 
a proper understanding of the obstacles to reform stressed by RCI.  
An assessment of the accuracy of our predictions following a successful 
conclusion to the DDR would most likely be highly beneficial to this line of 
studying. Similar theoretical underpinnings could apply to such a study. 
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